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I.  INTRODUCTION: ZACHARIAS AND A NEW PARADIGM 
Abandoning a state-based system of attorney regulation for a national 
and federal scheme has been a percolating question for the last twenty-
five years.  But the issue received its first in-depth scholarly treatment 
by Professor Fred Zacharias in his 1994 seminal article, Federalizing 
Legal Ethics.1  Professor Zacharias predicted that the increasing national 
character of the legal profession would result in increased pressure to 
create a uniform code of ethics.2  Against this pressure is the long 
tradition of state-based regulation of the legal profession.  As often was 
the case, Zacharias was a prophet and led the way.3 
In particular, he was quite right that the pressure toward a national 
legal profession would continue unabated.4  The regulatory consequence, 
however, has emerged in a somewhat unexpected form.  Federalization 
of legal ethics is occurring not through a tectonic shift but through a 
more stealth, incremental approach.  Rather than a conceptual, theoretical 
shift away from state-based regulation, the legal profession has experienced 
an increased regulatory contextualization of attorney conduct norms, 
particularly in federal practice.5  This is sharply demonstrated by federal 
 
 1. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994). 
 2. See id. at 335. 
 3. “Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes . . . .”  
23 Matthew 23:34 (King James).  One was Zacharias.  See id. at 23:35.  What an appropriate 
parallel to our wise Zacharias! 
 4. Professor Eli Wald explores this topic in greater detail in Eli Wald, Federalizing 
Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American Legal 
Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011). 
 5. Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, Federal Law of Attorney Conduct: 
Court Practice, in 30 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 801.02–.05 (3d ed. 2010). 
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agencies, which increasingly use their power to regulate practitioners to 
create and enforce supplemental norms for attorneys.  In this process, the 
center of gravity of attorney regulation has continued to move toward an 
increasing and complex web of federal regulation.6  This Article will 
carry on Professor Zacharias’s profound insights and prophecies by 
examining the trends in direct regulation of attorneys through federal 
law, with a particular focus on expanding agency regulation.  We will 
also touch on international trends that draw on federal treaty obligations 
to implement international norms of attorney conduct. 
The seeds for federal regulation were sown by an unlikely body.  The 
American Bar Association (ABA) was formed in 1878 with the express 
goal to identify the shared interests and serve as the national representative 
of the legal profession.7  This collective, shared interest across state 
boundaries, coupled with a strong resistance to federally imposed norms, 
reflected the profession’s uneasy relationship with this state-federal 
tension.8  As Professor Renee Knake noted in her analysis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2009 term cases involving lawyer conduct, the Supreme 
Court has looked to the “ABA as the source of model guidelines for the 
 
 6. See generally Ingrid Epperly, Who’s Afraid of a Uniform Federal Court Bar? 
Dispelling Fears About Standardizing Admission and Regulation of Attorneys in Federal 
Courts, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 811, 812 (2009) (demonstrating that “standardization 
of admissions and regulation in federal judicial courts will prove not only more cost-
efficient for attorneys and clients, but also more effective as a method of maintaining 
high ethical standards throughout the federal districts nationwide”); Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis 
Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 
768 n.11 (2004) (cataloging a number of commentators who have described the current 
regulatory scheme for lawyers as increasingly complex); Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 
and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959 (describing the shift from a 
state-based system of self-regulation of attorney conduct to federal regulation based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal 
Professional Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 
6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 57 (2007) (analyzing the appropriate institutional 
actors and appropriate considerations for the development of future professional 
responsibility rules). 
 7. See EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
AND ITS WORK 3–4, 17–18 (1953); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
BAR 562 (1911); see also About the American Bar Association, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.abanet.org/about/?gnav=global_about_lead (last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (“ABA 
Mission: To serve equally our members, our profession and the public by defending 
liberty and delivering justice as the national representative of the legal profession.”). 
 8. Professor Renee Knake explored the increasing constitutional dimensions of 
lawyering in Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the 
Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499 (2010). 
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profession and as an advocate of practicing lawyers in filing amicus 
curiae briefs.”9  The ABA, and state bar norms, which are typically 
based on the ABA Model Rules, can serve as a source of national core 
values. 
But, ironically, the thrust of the movement toward federalization has 
come not through federal articulation of national core values.  That task 
continues to be led by state bars and state regulatory apparatus, and the 
ABA and the American Law Institute (ALI)10 as national entities.11  The 
federal movement is to supplement, and occasionally change, the state-
based vision to adapt to the needs of federal practice.12  This is 
federalization through contextualization.  If legal practice is shaped by a 
hundred pokes of legal regulation, then for many lawyers an increasing 
percentage of those pokes comes from federal law.13  Expanding federal 
 
 9. Id. at 1565. 
 10. The American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
(2000), as is typical of ALI Restatements, draws heavily on state rules and cases to 
define national core values.  See Daniel R. Coquillette, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 
4–9, 258–61 (2005). 
 11. The appropriateness of the ABA’s leadership has been challenged by Andrew 
Kaufman, who would favor deferring instead to the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.  See Andrew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make 
the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in Federal Matters, 75 TUL. L. REV. 149, 157–
59 (2000).  On several occasions, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference has considered adopting the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct, 
but no actual rule proposals have been made.  See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., WORKING PAPERS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 223–34, 335–409 (1997); 
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 802.21–.23; see also Bruce A. Green, 
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and 
How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996).  Whether the 
Judicial Conference has the power to adopt federal rules directly regulating attorney 
conduct under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006), has been 
challenged.  See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority To 
Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003) 
(identifying the different potential sources of regulatory authority and highlighting the 
uncertainty of their reach).  But these challenges may be literally academic in two ways: 
(1) federal local rules already de facto directly regulate attorney conduct in federal 
courts, and (2) when uniform federal rulemaking was being examined, bills were 
introduced in Congress giving the Judicial Conference and its rules committees direct 
congressional authority to adopt uniform Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct.  See 
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 802.20–.23. 
 12. Other interesting proposals that could support this federalization trend include 
Professor Carol Needham’s argument that all lawyers who have been admitted to a state 
bar should be free to give advice on federal law.  See Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar 
Admission into Federal and State Components: National Admission for Advice on 
Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997).  This would uncouple the requirement that 
the advice be under the umbrella of agency authorization.  
 13. This phenomenon of expanded regulation from sources outside the bar has 
been well developed by many commentators, including Professor Zacharias, whose work 
is being honored in this memoriam.  See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: 
The Sources and Uses of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 
(2002); Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of 
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law increases the range of criminal penalties to which lawyers are 
subject.  Lawyers involved in federal securities practice, immigration, 
tax, patent, labor, and many other areas must be ever more attentive to 
the regulatory power of the agencies before which they practice.14  These 
agencies often focus on particular role concerns.  Recently, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has focused on in-house counsel to 
send signals about the advising role.15  The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) has sharpened the tax lawyer’s obligation when advising on tax 
shelters to prevent the abuse of lawyer services.16  Immigration has 
given a particular emphasis on the lawyer’s role in not facilitating sham 
marriages,17 and the patent office continues to send signals about the 
importance of full and accurate disclosure.18 
Many have noted the increasing emphasis on the lawyer as gatekeeper.19  
Although much passion and attention was directed to the SEC efforts to 
increase the gatekeeper role, other agencies were sharpening that vision 
of lawyer conduct and enhancing the gatekeeper role within the needs of 
the particular institutional setting. 
This contextualization of practice also gives fertile ground for continued 
research about institutional choices and competency in regulating 
attorneys.20  This regulatory approach allows for agency perspectives to 
be reflected in the law of lawyering.  This, of course, has some challenges, 
including concern of capture, unease if the regulatory approach involves 
opposing counsel having the power to institute professional sanctions, 
and inconsistencies of the regulatory approach with core values.  
Although occasional conflicts and tensions occur, our robust experience 
with federalism provides a mechanism to work through those differences.  It 
is not merely using the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to 
declare that federal regulation trump state rules.  A more complex  
  
 
Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559 (2005); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self 
Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.B(1). 
 16. See infra Part II.B(3). 
 17. See infra Part II.B(2). 
 18. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009); Hymel, supra note 13, at 903–04; infra Part 
II.B(4). 
 19. See Knake, supra note 8, at 1560–64. 
 20. See generally Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996) (discussing the question of who should regulate lawyers). 
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conversation occurs between and among these various interests to discuss 
and harmonize (eventually) the varying perspectives. 
II.  FEDERALIZATION: TAKING STOCK 
Federalization of legal ethics has come from four different methods, 
each lending wind to the sails of federalization. 
A.  Substantive Federal Statutes and the Rules Enabling Act as 
Regulating Attorneys: Some Examples 
One trend toward federalization comes from the application of generally 
applicable federal substantive law to lawyering activities, shifting the 
risk-management assessment of lawyers.21  Lawyers have always been 
subject to generally applicable laws, both federal and state, and our legal 
history is dotted with examples of use of those provisions against 
attorneys.  Criminal law is a prime example.  Clarence Darrow was charged 
and acquitted of bribing a juror, with a second trial ending in a hung 
jury.22  Howe and Hummell were infamous legends in the New York bar 
at the turn of the century before the firm imploded after Hummel’s 
conspiracy conviction.23  As Professor Bruce Green notes, criminal law 
can both establish standards of conduct for lawyers and influence the 
development of disciplinary standards.24 
With the rapidly increasing volume of federal law, it is almost 
inevitable that there will be a corresponding increase in application of 
that federal law to lawyers.25  The possibilities are expansive.  Conspiracy 
 
 21. For an interesting discussion of risk management in law, see Anthony V. 
Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 
(2006); and Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 
73 (2001). 
 22. See GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW: THE BRIBERY 
TRIAL OF AMERICA’S GREATEST LAWYER 433 (1993). 
 23. CAIT MURPHY, SCOUNDRELS IN LAW: THE TRIALS OF HOWE & HUMMEL, 
LAWYERS TO THE GANGSTERS, COPS, STARLETS, AND RAKES WHO MADE THE GILDED AGE 
247–48, 262–67 (2010). 
 24. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 327, 343 (1998); see also Bruce A. Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the 
Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 353, 353 (2007) (detailing the story of John 
Palmieri’s defense of John J. Delane in the year 1915, the subsequent debate over Palmieri’s 
conduct during the trial, and “efforts to locate a line between a permissibly zealous defense 
and an improperly overzealous one”). 
 25. The Duke Conference of May 10–11, 2010, sponsored by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, included extensive discussion of expanded attorney 
regulation to prevent discovery abuse, particularly spoliation of electronic evidence.  See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION § III(B) (2010) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
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and obstruction of justice loom in the background.26  Charges of making 
false statements to the government and perjury are risks for those who 
either intentionally lie or fool themselves into unsupportable factual 
distinctions.27  Federal bankruptcy law prohibiting any person from 
“knowingly and fraudulently mak[ing] false declarations” was the basis 
for a criminal prosecution of Milbank Tweed partner John Gellene, 
whose story is told with riveting effect in Professor Milton Regan’s book 
Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street Lawyer.28  Class action law 
firms have been indicted for sharing fees with clients.29  Lawyer Lynne 
Stuart was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by 
violating the special administrative measures imposed on her client.30  
Immigration lawyers have been criminally charged for engaging in 
immigration fraud, particularly in the sham marriage area.31  Deliberate 
ignorance in the face of client criminal conduct is risky behavior for a 
lawyer.32  And criminal contempt can be brought against lawyers for 
conduct deemed to interfere with the administration of justice.33  
Although not targeting the lawyers for criminal conduct, in criminal 
investigations against corporate clients, the Department of Justice has, in 
 
JUSTICE].  But whether the Conference will result in new federal rules remains to be 
seen. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (“If 
lawyers are not punished for their criminal conduct and corrupt endeavors to manipulate 
the administration of justice, the result would be the same: the weakening of an ethical 
adversarial system and the undermining of just administration of the law.”); United States 
v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving a lawyer who was convicted of 
conspiracy to obstruct justice). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Baum, 32 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 28. United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 585–86 (7th Cir. 1999) (criminal 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)); MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU 
KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004). 
 29. See Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 159 (2008). 
 30. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 108 (2d Cir. 2009).  For a very 
interesting analysis of issues raised by lawyer solidarity with one’s client, see Peter 
Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for 
Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003). 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos Algarin, 584 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1505 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(overturning wiretap conviction of a lawyer who used tapes made by the client, and 
noting that “[a]lthough an attorney must not turn a blind eye to the obvious, he should be 
able to give his clients the benefit of the doubt”). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1339–41 (9th Cir. 1981).  
In obstruction of justice enforcement, there is a safe harbor for a bona fide legal defense, 
but it is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the defendant.  See 
United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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the words of one commentator, “a trend towards using the criminal law 
and the government’s investigatory tools against lawyers because of 
what appears to be a deep-seated suspicion of legal advice as something 
harmful or inappropriate.”34  And some have urged criminalization of the 
legal advice given by lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel concerning 
the legality of torture.35 
Civil actions have also swept up attorneys into the fray.  The savings 
and loan crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated civil 
enforcement actions by the Office of Thrift Counsel against attorneys.36  
Subsequent malpractice actions for violation of federal standards helped 
reshape the expectations in this area of practice as well.37  Aiding and 
abetting liability lurks in the background as a possible theory.38 
Similarly, the SEC has been aggressive in bringing actions against 
attorneys.  SEC Chair Christopher Cox publicly stated in 2007 that 
“[i]t’s because the roles of gatekeeper and watchdog come with a great 
deal of responsibility that, when professionals—lawyers or accountants 
—fail to live up to their responsibility, the Commission will bring 
enforcement actions.”39  The SEC has brought actions against attorneys 
for backdating and insider trading, and for failing to engage in a 
 
 34. Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 674 (2005). 
 35. See Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign To Criminalize 
Good Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2009). 
 36. See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 988–
89 (1993); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor 
and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 244 
(1998). 
 37. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary 
Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 97 (2008); Anthony E. 
Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm 
Management—Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677, 678, 681 
(1994); Susan M. Freeman, Are DIP and Committee Counsel Fiduciaries for Their 
Clients’ Constituents or the Bankruptcy Estate? What Is a Fiduciary, Anyway?, 17 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 291, 362 & n.332, 381 n.417 (2009); John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics 
Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 973–78 (2009); Meredith E. Level, Note, Do the 
Shoes Fit? Creating Federal Common Law in Legal Malpractice Cases When a Banking 
Regulator Is a Party, 23 STETSON L. REV. 893, 902–03 (1994). 
 38. See generally SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a 
lawyer’s conviction of aiding and abetting securities violations justified permanent 
injunction against future violations); Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and 
Abetting: Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” To Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 
PACE L. REV. 75 (2008) (analyzing state law claims primarily). 
 39. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the 2007 
Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807 
cc.htm.  There have been similar initiatives in the past.  See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm’r, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before the Banking Corporation and Business Law 
Section of the New York State Bar Association: The Emerging Responsibilities of the 
Securities Lawyer  (Jan. 24, 1974), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/012474sommer.pdf. 
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reasonable investigation before issuing an opinion that bonds would be 
tax exempt.40  In recent years, the SEC has gone after general counsel in 
particular.41  Some efforts were more successful than others, but the 
legal profession has taken note of the effort.42 
A growing body of statutory and procedural provisions also shapes the 
attorney-client relationship in targeted areas.  Congress has limited the 
use of legal services money, prohibiting class actions, attorneys’ fees 
and imposing other restrictions.43  The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) prohibits lawyers, 
who are debt relief agents within the meaning of the Act, from advising 
clients to take on more debt before filing for bankruptcy.44  Class action 
representation has been reshaped by both legislation and changes to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Indeed, acting pursuant to congressional 
authority under the Rules Enabling Act,45 the Judicial Conference of the 
United States has directly regulated attorney conduct in filing frivolous 
actions,46 in representing class plaintiffs,47 and in spoliation of evidence.48  
Recent proposals growing out of the 2010 Duke Conference on Civil 
Procedure, now pending before the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 
could include greater attorney regulation in regard to spoliation of 
 
 40. See, e.g., Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 41. See generally W. Hardy Callcott & Abigail C. Slonecker, A Review of Recent 
SEC Actions Against Lawyers, 42 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 71, 77–78 (2009), 
available at http://www.bingham.com/ExternalObjects/Docs/Callcott_Slonecker_RSCR_3-
18-09_(4152).pdf (“In over a third of the investigations that resulted in SEC enforcement 
actions, in-house counsel for the issuers were charged with violations.  The issuers’ 
outside counsel were not charged in any of these cases, although the SEC investigated 
some outside counsel.” (footnote omitted)). 
 42. See, e.g., Fehn, 97 F.3d at 1276; SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 
F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 687 
(D.D.C. 1978) (holding that although defendants violated the securities laws, the 
injunction was denied because the SEC did not establish that defendants would violate 
securities laws in the future). 
 43. See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke 
the Courts? Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by 
Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 874 (2002); Ilisabeth Smith 
Bornstein, Comment, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of 
the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 693, 693. 
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–2074 (2006). 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 47. Id. 23. 
 48. Id. 26. 
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electronic evidence.49  Although we should not overemphasize these 
statutory and rulemaking provisions, federal law and federal liability 
play an important role in shaping one or more norms of attorney conduct. 
B.  Federal Agency Authority and Regulating Attorneys 
Most federal agencies play a dominant role in specialty areas of law, 
and many of these agencies directly regulate the conduct of attorneys 
who appear before them.  Several factors support this independent 
agency regulation.  In many contexts, such as patent, labor, and tax, both 
lawyers and authorized nonlawyer practitioners can represent clients 
before the agency.50  In these “mixed-profession” settings, “there is a 
clear need for some form of ethical regulation beyond that provided by 
the individual professional organizations.”51 
Representation before agencies also involves particular practice 
context, so that agency-level regulation tailors the professional 
regulation to reflect the unique aspects of the practice setting.52  This is 
an example of the context-driven, middle-level approach advocated by 
Professor David Wilkins in Legal Realism for Lawyers.53 
Agency practice also provides a rich context in which the public 
interest can be identified with greater specificity.  For example, whether 
imposing a gatekeeper role is good or bad policy requires us to 
understand the role lawyers play within a particular context.  What might 
be quite tolerable in an advisory capacity might be much less tolerable in 
a litigation setting.54 
Representation before agencies also typically puts a premium on 
specialized knowledge of the attorneys.  That offers advantages to repeat 
actors, who may have an incentive to curry favor with the agency.55  
 
 49. See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 25. 
 50. See infra Part II.B 
 51. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 6 
(4th ed. 2008) (“It is important that there be uniform standards for the various 
professionals to the extent that they perform identical services in the tax market.”). 
 52. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: 
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 829, 841 (2002) (“The assumptions that all lawyers and all clients are the same 
have led to perhaps the most dramatic delusion inherent in the modern professional 
codes; namely, that a single set of rules should apply equally to, and can adequately govern, 
all legal representation.”). 
 53. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 
(1990). 
 54. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for 
the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293–95 (2003). 
 55. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional 
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1995) (“[T]he 
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Because of the fluid movement between the public and private sector, 
there is also concern about the corrosive effect on public officials who 
may be seeking lucrative future jobs with the lawyers who appear before 
the agency.56  Although federal conflict-of-interest laws address common 
concerns among the federal agencies, these issues can be fine-tuned by 
agency-level regulations.57 
This knowledge-specific environment also has risks.  There is a 
concern of capture, so that “opponents (especially repeat players) have a 
variety of incentives to enlist” attorney conduct mechanisms “to advance 
their own goals.”58  Allowing agencies the power to regulate lawyers 
who are sometimes their adversaries in a litigation context could also be 
used to unduly pressure opposing counsel or drive a wedge between the 
attorney and client.59 
In a quest for more context for these generalities, set out below is a 
brief description of six federal agency systems that regulate the conduct 
of attorneys who appear before the agency.  One or two instances of 
agency regulation might be an anomaly.  The multiple federal agencies 
that regulate attorneys indicate a trend. 
1.  Corporate Lawyers and the Securities and                                        
Exchange Commission 
The SEC’s expanded regulation of attorneys has received extensive 
commentary in the last decade.60  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act clarified the 
SEC’s authority to regulate attorneys, and the SEC has taken that 
 
importance to clients of hiring lawyers with expertise and a proven track record in 
representing clients before particular regulatory agencies creates a situation in which 
lawyers representing clients before agencies easily are ‘captured’ by the agencies before 
whom they practice.”). 
 56. Our thanks to Professor Renee Jones of Boston College Law School, who is 
currently researching this topic. 
 57. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–227 (2006). 
 58. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2002). 
 59. See Julie Andersen Hill, Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation 
Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 373, 373 (2009). 
 60. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at § 815; Peter J. Henning, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better To Prevent Corporate 
Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323 (2004); Hill, supra note 59. 
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authority to heart.61  SEC Rule 102(e) provides authority to discipline 
attorneys who lack the “requisite qualifications to represent others,” 
“character or integrity,” or who have “engaged in unethical or improper 
professional conduct,” or “willfully violated, or willfully aided and 
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or 
the rules and regulations thereunder.”62 
The SEC regulation of attorneys emerges in three distinct ways.  First, 
as addressed above, the SEC has aggressively pursued some lawyers for 
securities violations.  In particular, the SEC has pursued in-house counsel 
for backdating options, charging those attorneys with primary violations 
of the securities law.  In some instances the lawyer violated securities 
laws as a private actor.  But in other circumstances the SEC was 
challenging the lawyer for lawyering activity.63 
The second form of SEC regulation occurs through rule 102(e) 
proceedings, or closely related obligations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the regulations under it, against counsel who assist in transactional 
activities.  These rule 102(e) proceedings can be closely linked to 
primary securities violations.  A primary violation will result in an 
exclusion from practice before the SEC under rule 102(e), so those 
enforcement decisions obviously have a profound effect on the attorney-
client relationship.  Both the underlying substantive allegation and the 
professional sanction under rule 102(e) can be resolved during a 
settlement in which the attorney admits to the securities violation and 
agrees to be suspended from practice.64  The scope of the willful violation 
provision is enhanced by the Commission’s view that willful means only 
that the respondent intentionally committed the act that was found to 
have violated the securities laws.65 
A third body of cases sanction attorneys for litigation misconduct.  
This poses an interesting conceptual challenge because the SEC is on 
one side of the litigation and is sanctioning an opposing counsel.  As 
Professor Julie Andersen Hill notes, this raises some significant 
theoretical concerns about potential abuse.66 
 
 61. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in 
the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2010). 
 62. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2010). 
 63. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 64. See, e.g., James A Fitzhenry, Exchange Act Release No. 46,870, Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1670 (Nov. 21, 2002) (five-year suspension by 
consent); Craig Scott, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,077 (Feb. 14, 2005) (three-year 
suspension by consent). 
 65. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION 
UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 2:115 (2010). 
 66. Hill, supra note 59. 
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2.  Immigration Lawyers and the Executive Office of                        
Immigration Review 
Immigration practitioners, both attorneys and nonattorneys, have also 
experienced an increased regulation of their conduct.  The Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), a federal agency under the 
Department of Justice that oversees immigration courts, has the authority 
to determine both who may practice and the norms of conduct.67  In June 
2000, the EOIR, in conjunction with the now defunct Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), strengthened and clarified the Rules and 
Procedures for Professional Conduct for Practitioners.  The EOIR 
regulations subdivided the power to regulate based on the context within 
the immigration system, separating appearance before adjudicative 
bodies, for example, asylum proceedings and adjustment interviews, and 
separately authorized the EOIR to engage in similar investigations for 
issues in appearances before the board and immigration courts.68  
Amended again in December 2008, the strengthened regulations focus in 
particular on issues of neglect by practitioners—failure to abide by client 
instructions, lack of reasonable diligence, competence and promptness, 
and failure to stay in contact with clients—and lack of candor before the 
EOIR tribunals.69  One goal of the 2008 amendments was to make the 
EOIR’s professional conduct regulations “more consistent with the 
ethical standards applicable in most states and the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”70 
The EOIR is not shy about establishing and publishing these norms.  
A link to the list of disciplined practitioners and the most recent 
disciplinary actions appear on the homepage of its website.71  Over 400 
names appear on the list of disciplined practitioners. 
The regulations give adjudicating officials of the immigration court 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals the authority to sanction “any 
 
 67. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2010).  See EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 15–30, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPrac 
Manual/Chap%202.pdf. 
 68. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3, 292 (2010); 65 Fed. Reg. 39,513 (June 27, 2000). 
 69. News Release, Exec. Office of Immigration Review, EOIR Implements 
Regulation To Enhance Attorney Discipline Program (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AttyDiscReg010609.pdf. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. List of Disciplined Practitioners, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last updated July 9, 2010). 
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practitioner[,] if it finds it to be in the public interest to do so.”72  It 
appears that a significant majority of those actions are instances of 
reciprocal discipline, in which the EOIR is adopting the recommended 
discipline from the state bar.73  Even with a heavy focus on reciprocal 
discipline, there is an edginess to seeing a list of more than 400 lawyers 
and practitioners listed in such a public and prominent fashion.  This 
public presentation supports the EOIR’s goal of protecting vulnerable 
clients from incompetent or unethical practitioners.  It also has the effect 
of sending a signal to immigration practitioners that the EOIR is monitoring 
lawyering conduct. 
3.  Tax Lawyers and the Treasury Department 
Tax attorneys have long understood that their ethical obligations are 
determined heavily by federal law and norms of practice before the tax 
courts.  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by federal statute to 
regulate the practice of representative practitioners.74  The Treasury 
Department regulations, known as Circular 230, govern tax practitioners, 
both lawyers and nonlawyers.75  Circular 230 is a substantial set of 
regulations that establishes an Office of Professional Responsibility and 
sets out who may practice.76  Circular 230 also sets out particular duties 
and restrictions in practice before the IRS, including circumstances when 
the lawyer has knowledge of a client’s omission,77 obligations to 
exercise due diligence,78 practice by former government employees or 
their partners and associates,79 fees,80 return of client records,81 conflicts 
of interest,82 solicitation,83 and standards for advising with respect to tax 
returns,84 among other topics.  The Circular gives special attention to 
issues of “[i]ncompetence and disreputable conduct.”85  Anyone who has 
 
 72. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101(a) (2010). 
 73. We have begun an empirical examination of this database, which hopefully will 
provide more insights into the pattern of disciplinary actions by the EOIR. 
 74. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2006). 
 75. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2010).  For an early history of Circular 230, see Dennis J. 
Ventry Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury’s 1986 Circular 230 Proposal, 112 TAX 
NOTES 691 (2006). 
 76. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.1–.8 (2010). 
 77. Id. § 10.21. 
 78. Id. § 10.22. 
 79. Id. § 10.25. 
 80. Id. § 10.27. 
 81. Id. § 10.28. 
 82. Id. § 10.29. 
 83. Id. § 10.30. 
 84. Id. § 10.34. 
 85. Id. § 10.51. 
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corresponded by e-mail with a tax lawyer has seen the standard Circular 
230 disclaimer at the end of the e-mail. 
In the early 1980s government officials threatened government action 
if the bar did not take action to establish professional standards in tax 
shelter opinions.86  Both the bar and IRS would take action.87  By the 
mid-1980s tax practitioners began noting that “professional standards in 
the tax marketplace are undergoing dramatic change.”88  Circular 230 
has been amended over time to strengthen the obligations of tax attorneys, 
including the 2004 amendments to impose stronger due diligence 
requirements on tax attorneys who provide tax shelter advice.89  More 
recent congressional and Treasury action now requires that the advice 
position have a “more likely than not” chance of succeeding on the 
merits, and if not, the position must be disclosed to the IRS.90  The IRS 
has also clarified the underlying standards for tax shelters, creating a 
flurry of legal commentary on the content of the legal rules.91  But a dual 
track of regulating both the content of the rules applied to the taxpayers 
and those who assist clients in applying the rules, namely, tax practitioners, 
increases the chance of compliance. 
As with all regulations, the real question is whether these attorney 
conduct norms have meaning in the lives of tax lawyers.  The enhanced 
standards for tax shelter advice have continued to draw the attention of 
practitioners, with a flurry of articles and practice commentary.92  As a 
tax attorney, it would be hard to ignore the enforcement actions of the 
IRS against attorneys.  In 2005, the law firm of Jenkins & Gilchrist 
closed after admitting that it owed a penalty of $76 million to the IRS for 
 
 86. James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 
314, 346 and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 217 (1985). 
 87. Id. at 217–18. 
 88. Id. at 209. 
 89. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax 
Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 79, 95–97 (2006). 
 90. See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 31 (2004). 
 91. See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation 
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006); Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter 
Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267 
(2008). 
 92. See David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to 
Others—The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty 
to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009). 
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abusive and fraudulent tax shelters.93  The IRS public statement 
accompanying that announcement declared that “[p]ursuing abusive tax 
shelters is a top priority for the IRS.”94  Tax attorneys risk a civil 
preparer penalty for understatement of liability or claim for a refund 
when there was not a reasonable belief or basis for the position taken.95  
No one would be surprised to learn that submitting false or misleading 
information in connection to with a client’s return can result in 
suspension from practice.96  And a tax attorney who fails to file her own 
tax return is at serious risk of being barred from practice before the 
IRS.97 
Of course, formal agency sanctions are not the only concern.  High-
profile investigations by Congress or the IRS can be both embarrassing 
and time-consuming.  The IRS has also entered into public settlement 
agreements that publicize investigations, creating a public reprimand.  
For example, in 2007 the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) announced a settlement with two attorneys concerning a municipal 
bond issuance.98  The OPR had alleged inadequate due diligence.99  
The attorneys settled by agreement to comply fully with practices 
implemented by their current firm in its public finance group.100 
 
 93. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-news/ir-07-071.pdf (“‘[T]his should be a lesson to all tax professionals that 
they must not aid or abet tax evasion by clients or promote potentially abusive or illegal 
tax shelters, or ignore their responsibilities to register or disclose tax shelters . . . .’”). 
 94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
 95. See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009).  For examples of enforcement of 
this provision, see Goulding v. United States, 957 F.2d 1420, 1423–24 (7th Cir. 1992), 
which states, “Section 6694 of the Internal Revenue Code penalizes income tax return 
preparers for understatements of taxpayer’s liability which result from negligent 
disregard of rules and regulations by the return preparer or from [willful] attempts by the 
return preparer to understate the tax due.”  Section 6694(b) imposes a separate penalty 
for “willful attempt” to understate liability or a “reckless or intentional disregard of rules 
and regulations.”  See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2009).  This preparer penalty is 
subject to limitations that it does not apply if the preparer had reasonable cause for the 
understatement and the preparer acted in good faith.  See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 
51, at 105; see also I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282; T.D. 9436, 2009-3 I.R.B. 
268. 
 96. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-19 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www. 
unclefed.com/Tax-News/2010/nr10-19.html. 
 97. See, e.g., Owrutsky v. Brady, No. 89-2402, 1991 WL 18156, at *1 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 19, 1991) (holding attorney who failed to file tax returns disbarred from practice 
before IRS for voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, even though the 
attorney was eligible for refunds); I.R.S. News Release IR-2010-27 (Mar. 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-News/2010/nr10-27.html (discussing attorney 
barred from practice before the IRS for forty-eight months for failure to file one federal 
tax return and filing another five returns late). 
 98. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-197 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www. 
unclefed.com/Tax-News/2007/nr07-197.html. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Perhaps the most effective sanction is a successful malpractice action.  
Tax lawyers should be particularly attentive to the malpractice 
implications if violating agency norms causes harm to the client.  As 
Professor Jay Soled has noted, “taxpayers who invested in failed tax 
shelters have brought an avalanche of malpractice cases against their 
advising lawyers and accountants.”101  Both the temptations and the 
punishments can be severe in the extraordinary context of tax practice.  
In this world of tax conduct, there is relatively little discussion of bar 
disciplinary actions.  The regulation in this area is dominated by tax 
court norms and malpractice.  The ABA as a source of norms, however, 
appears to have been influential in the dialectic between congressional 
and agency action and bar norms.102 
4.  Intellectual Property Lawyers and the Patent and                      
Trademark Office 
Congress has expressly authorized the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) to regulate attorneys and agents who appear before it.103  
The USPTO has a dedicated Office of Enrollment and Discipline 
(OED).104  Although the practice in trademark cases is generally open 
only to licensed attorneys, the patent office has a fully developed 
alternative practice scheme that closely parallels state bars.105  The 
USPTO requires that practitioners pass a registration exam, commonly 
known as the Patent Bar, and demonstrate “good moral character and 
reputation.”106  Patent practitioners include both attorneys and nonattorneys, 
who are known as patent agents.107  All practitioners appearing before 
the USPTO, whether attorneys or patent agents, must comply with the  
  
 
 101. Soled, supra note 91, at 268. 
 102. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 14–16. 
 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 104. See Laura Heyne, The Disciplinary Function of the PTO’s Office of General 
Counsel, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 65 (2010); Office of Enrollment and Discipline: 
OED Responsibilities, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/ 
offices/ogc/oed.jsp (Aug. 26, 2010, 2:23 PM). 
 105. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.14 (2010); Trademark FAQs, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#Other005 (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). 
 106. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (2010). 
 107. Id. § 11.1. 
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Patent and Trademark Office Code of Professional Conduct, which is 
based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.108 
The Patent and Trademark Office has a well-developed system to both 
investigate and bring action against patent practitioners who violate the 
USPTO Code of Professional Conduct, are convicted of a serious crime, 
have been disciplined by another jurisdiction or other federal agency, or 
have violated any oaths of office.109  As with Board of Immigration 
Appeals, much of the focus of the USPTO disciplinary process is on 
reciprocal discipline.110  Violations that are uniquely tailored to patent 
practice include backdating correspondence to the USPTO, abandoning 
patent applications, deceptive advertising, and withholding from the 
patent examiner known information about prior art.111 
This latter point of withholding known information is a particular 
concern to the USPTO because its Rules of Practice impose a higher 
duty of disclosure, candor, and good faith on individuals who file and 
prosecute patent applications.112  This flows from the nature of the legal 
right given in the patent context.  It is not an adversarial proceeding but 
a government grant of exclusive rights, which imposes a legal duty of 
full disclosure as a condition to the right.113  The patent system depends 
on this higher level of disclosure than we typically see in other legal 
contexts.114 
As with immigration, the USPTO Office of Enrollment and Discipline 
makes its final decisions available online.  The office lists 202 reported 
discipline matters as of December 2010.115  The most serious sanction of 
exclusion from practice appears to be reserved for instances in which the 
practitioner was convicted of a crime and has already been disciplined 
by the practitioner’s state bar.116 
 
 108. See David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
261, 265 (2007); William J. Jacob, Professional Ethics Before the USPTO: A Discussion 
for Beginners, 16 PROF. LAW., no.2, 2005 at 22, 22; see generally 37 C.F.R.                 
§§ 10.2–.112 (2010). 
 109. 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(b)(1)(i)–(v) (2010) (grounds for discipline).  The disciplinary 
process is set out in id. § 11.24. 
 110. See Heyne, supra note 104, at 67. 
 111. See id. at 69. 
 112. 37 C.F.R § 1.56(a) (2010). 
 113. See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 31:63–:65 (4th ed. 2010). 
 114. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“The highest standards 
of honesty and candor on the part of applicants in presenting such facts to the office are 
thus necessary elements in a working patent system.”). 
 115. Decisions of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/DispatchOEDServlet?decisionType=Discipline& 
contractNo=&respName=&txtInput_StartDate=&txtInput_EndDate=&docTextSearch=&p
age=9999999 (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). 
 116. Heyne, supra note 104, at 69. 
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5. Veterans’ Lawyers and the Veterans Benefits Administration 
The Veterans Benefits Administration came late to the issue of 
authorizing representatives.  Until 2008, it was a crime to accept more 
than $10 to represent a person with a VA claim, which obviously shut 
down any system of paid representation.117  The U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of this exclusion in 1985 when the Court 
deferred to congressional intent to make the proceedings informal and 
nonadversarial, and to ensure that the veteran would not have to share 
the benefit award with attorneys.118  This prohibition was amended in the 
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, which now allows attorneys fees under 
specific circumstances but largely prevents attorney involvement until a 
notice of disagreement is filed, which generally occurs after the record is 
set.119 
Paid representation is now allowed beginning at the second stage of 
review.  A “Notice of Disagreement” triggers a review at the VA Regional 
Office, which can be formally appealed to the Board of Veteran Appeals 
(BVA).120  The BVA findings may be appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims.121 
The Veterans Administration also sets out procedures for the designation 
of authorized representatives.122  Both attorneys and nonattorneys may 
be designated as representatives.123 
Continued restrictions on when attorneys may receive compensation 
may be one reason why the veterans bar is comparatively small.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims lists about 700 practitioners  
 
 117. The $10 limit appeared at 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (2006).  See generally Barton F. 
Stichman, Advocating Benefits for Veterans, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 256 (2009). 
 118. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321–26 
(1985), superseded by statute, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 
Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 119. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).  
For a fuller description of the current provision, see Matthew J. Dowd, No Claim 
Adjudication Without Representation: A Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 53, 60–64 (2007); and Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying 
Disabled Veterans the Freedom To Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 441–43 
(2009). 
 120. See Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans 
Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1160–61 (2010). 
 121. Id. at 1161. 
 122. 38 C.F.R. § 14.630 (2010). 
 123. Id. 
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approved for practice before the court.124  This is a relatively small 
number given the high caseload.125  Even with this relatively small bar, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims maintains a link to 
publicly identify disciplined attorneys, setting out links for disbarred 
attorneys, two-year suspensions, and reciprocal suspensions.126  The 
published content is slender, however, with no attorneys disbarred or 
suspended, and two receiving reciprocal discipline.  One inference, 
perhaps premature, is that the role of attorneys is sufficiently hampered 
that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims does not need to focus on 
attorney misconduct.  And as with other areas of law, it is relatively rare 
that an administrative action to suspend an attorney from practice 
reaches the courts.127 
6.  Labor Lawyers and the National Labor Relations Board 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulations state that 
“[a]ny attorney or other representative appearing or practicing before the 
Agency shall conform to the standards of ethical and professional 
conduct required of practitioners before the courts.”128  The NLRB is 
authorized to discipline an attorney or representative “at any stage of any 
Agency proceeding.”129  The regulations establish a procedure, with 
initial investigation by the Associate General Counsel, Division of 
Operations-Management, or the Associate General Counsel’s designee, 
as the investigating officer.130 
Lawyers practicing before the NLRB have been disciplined under this 
process for a variety of conduct.  For example, a lawyer was reprimanded 
and reported to the state bar for failure to comply with applicable rules 
concerning conflicts of interest and failing to factually investigate 
 
 124. Public List of Practitioners, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/practitioners/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010); see also Wright, 
supra note 119, at 446. 
 125. See Wright, supra note 119, at 439. 
 126. Disciplined Attorneys, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www. 
uscourts.cavc.gov/practitioners/DisciplinaryAction.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). 
 127. See, e.g., Malik v. Shinseki, No. 10-233, 2010 WL 1252254, at *1 (U.S. App. 
Vet. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying a petition for writ of mandamus because “[t]he petitioner’s 
accreditation to represent claimants before [the] VA was cancelled . . . on the grounds 
that the petitioner had knowingly presented false information to [the] VA and had accepted 
unlawful compensation for representing claimants before [the] VA”). 
 128. 29 C.F.R. § 102.177(a) (2010). 
 129. Id. § 102.177(d) (“Misconduct by an attorney or other representative at any 
stage of any Agency proceeding, including but not limited to misconduct at a hearing, 
shall be grounds for discipline.  Such misconduct of an aggravated character shall be 
grounds for suspension and/or disbarment from practice before the Agency and/or other 
sanctions.”). 
 130. Id. § 102.177(e)(1). 
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submissions.131  Lawyers have been suspended for a pattern of misconduct, 
such as engaging in ad hominem comments, misuse of affidavits, racial 
slurs, misrepresentations and obstruction, and delay of the hearing.132  
Not surprisingly, physical violence will result in a suspension from 
practice.133  Nonattorney representatives have also been sanctioned 
under this provision.134 
It is somewhat more complicated when lawyers or representatives 
engage in misconduct during an NLRB hearing.  In some cases, the 
board has been more rigorous in requiring that a formal section 
102.177(d) hearing be instituted.135  In other circumstances, an 
administrative law judge has been allowed to immediately sanction an 
attorney, including excluding an attorney for cumulative inappropriate 
conduct and false and misleading testimony.136  An attorney might be 
warned during a hearing that future conduct may warrant referral to the 
investigating officer for possible disciplinary action.137 
As important as formal authority is the NLRB’s desire to focus on the 
issue.  The NLRB General Counsel’s office has explored whether to 
engage in more rulemaking concerning attorney conduct in labor 
practice.138  At this time, however, the attorney conduct regulation at the 
NLRB is not as aggressive as other federal agencies. 
7.  All Agencies: An Amorphous Definition of the Practice of Law 
A federal perspective has offered one interesting twist on the traditional 
notions of self-regulation.  These federal agencies are much less 
persuaded by concerns for unauthorized practice of law.  Many agencies 
are granted express authority to determine who may practice—and allow 
 
 131. See, e.g., Simpson, 347 N.L.R.B. 883 (2006) (reprimand and referral to bar). 
 132. See, e.g., Keiler, 316 N.L.R.B. 763 (1995). 
 133. See, e.g., Murphy, 338 N.L.R.B. 769 (2002) (responding to allegation that 
respondent struck decertification petitioner in face during a Board-conducted decertification 
election). 
 134. See, e.g., Einy, 352 N.L.R.B.1178 (2008). 
 135. See, e.g., Mail Contractors of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 1158, 1159 (2006) (agreeing 
that published reprimand in written opinion constitutes a sanction that requires section 
102.177 procedures). 
 136. See, e.g., USA Remediation Servs., Inc., No. 5-CA-31524, 2006 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 
89 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
 137. See, e.g., McAllister Towing & Transp. Co., 341 N.L.R.B. 394, 427 (2004). 
 138. See LORI W. KETCHAM, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGAL ETHICS AT THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/ 
dlcomm/mw/papers/2009/papers/mw-m.pdf. 
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for nonlawyer practitioners—including patent,139 tax,140 immigration,141 
and labor.142  Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal agency decisions 
override state regulations, so that a state cannot prohibit the federal 
practice by nonattorneys.143  Lawyers and nonlawyers have provided 
services in these contexts side-by-side with relatively little controversy. 
Despite this experience, both the American Bar Association and state 
regulatory systems continue to pursue a policy of strengthening legal 
norms to bar unauthorized practice.144  These efforts suffered a blow in 
2002, when the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice 
of Law proposed a definition for public discussion.145  The proposed 
definition was challenged by the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, which expressed concern that the Model Definition 
was overly broad and likely to hurt consumers.146  These concerns reflect 
the 1984 challenges by the Department of Justice to state bar association 
agreements with the banking industry.147  This agency experience with 
shared practice is an important datum point in the debate about 
unauthorized practice. 
 
 139. 35 U.S.C. § 31 (2006). 
 140. Id. § 330 (setting out authority to regulate the practice of representatives of persons 
before the Department of the Treasury). 
 141. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2010). 
 142. 29 C.F.R. § 18.34(g) (2009). 
 143. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) 
(“Florida may not deny [petitioner] the right to perform the functions within the scope of 
the federal authority.”). 
 144. See Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law: Challenge 
Statement, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_challenge.html 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (noting the growing gray area where nonlawyers provide 
services that are difficult to characterize “as being, or not being, the delivery of legal 
services,” which may be partly responsible for “spotty enforcement of unauthorized 
practice of law statutes across the nation and arguably an increasing number of attendant 
problems related to the delivery of services by nonlawyers”). 
 145. See John Gibeaut, Another Try: ABA Task Force Takes a Shot at Defining the 
Practice of Law, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 18. 
 146. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n to Members of 
the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Am. Bar Ass’n (Dec. 20, 
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/ftc.pdf (“[T]he DOJ and the 
FTC believe that consumers generally benefit from lawyer-nonlawyer competition in the 
provision of certain services. . . .  We conclude that the proposed definition is not in the 
public interest because the harms it imposes on consumers by limiting competition are 
likely much greater than any consumer harm that it prevents.”). 
 147. Id.; see also ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 443–49 
(3d ed. 1996); COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, NONLAWYER 
ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS (1995). 
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C.  Federal Litigation Norms 
Litigation norms have long been established primarily by the courts, 
not the state regulatory apparatus.  Of course, almost all American 
judges have come through the common training ground of national 
American law schools and have been inculcated in the common values 
of the legal profession.  But fine-tuning those values in the context of 
litigation has been left to the courts.  Federal courts have established a 
fairly wide body of doctrine on attorney conduct.148  Through the 
Federal Rules Enabling Act the courts have embraced the power to make 
rules on attorney conduct.149  And case-by-case adjudication has resulted 
in a rich body of doctrine addressing conflicts of interest, confidentiality, 
contact with represented persons, and the like.  The conflicts doctrine 
developed by federal courts has been particularly influential in creating 
understandings of appropriate behavior in the litigation context. 
Bankruptcy courts offer another interesting example.  Ethical issues in 
bankruptcy, which is of course a federal practice, are factually and 
legally complex.  In 1998, Professor Nancy Rapoport urged that the time 
had come to create a federal law of bankruptcy ethics, arguing 
persuasively that the state-based norms offer little guidance for the 
particular issues that arise in bankruptcy practice.150  Although formal 
national rules have yet to be adopted through the Rules Enabling Act, 
the bankruptcy courts have looked more widely than just state rules of 
conduct to analyze norms of conduct in bankruptcy practice.151  And the 
power to control fees has given bankruptcy judges an enormous power 
to make bankruptcy lawyers pay attention to what courts say is 
 
 148. See generally McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5; Judith A. McMorrow, 
The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 
SMU L. REV. 3 (2005). 
 149. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 5, at §§ 805.01–.07; see also FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 294–308. 
 150. Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of 
Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 46–50 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport, 
The Intractable Problem of Bankruptcy Ethics: Square Peg, Round Hole, 30 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 977, 982–85 (2002). 
 151. See, e.g., Rossana v. Momot, 395 B.R. 697, 701 n.4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008) 
(stating that a court may look beyond the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct to “consider 
other relevant authorities, such as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS, the actual Model Rules and their related commentaries”). 
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appropriate behavior.152  The net effect is that federal bankruptcy courts 
are the dominant regulators in this area. 
D.  Treaty Obligations, International Practice, and                          
Technology Pressures 
The shift of regulation has moved beyond simply federal legislative, 
agency, or court regulation of attorneys.  As many other commentators 
have noted, the hydraulic pressure on legal practice from both expanded 
technology and the global economy has shifted the focus to international 
practice.  U.S. law firms are expanding abroad, and foreign firms and 
foreign legal consultants are coming to the United States to advise their 
clients.153  This internationalization is not limited to large firms.  Solo 
and small firm practitioners are often needed to address the legal 
problems of the growing U.S. immigrant community.  Some of those 
problems involve cross-border concerns—movement of property, 
inheritance, marriage, child custody, and other issues that have international 
dimensions.  This again creates pressure to look to national norms to 
adapt to these pressures. 
The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was formed in 2009 to review 
the “U.S. system of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in 
technology and global legal practice developments.”154  Many of the 
questions that arise from the cross-border practice will likely result in 
recommendations on how states can reduce the barriers to cross-border 
practice.  Problems in multijurisdictional practice and the movement of 
in-house counsel across both state and national borders are challenges 
that cannot be contained by simply insisting that the world adjust to the 
state-based model of regulation.  Competition from international firms 
for a worldwide market for legal services also pressures U.S. regulatory 
structures to consider alternate models being adopted abroad.155 
 
 152. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 
82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in 
Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263 (2010). 
 153. A rich body of literature is emerging on this subject.  See, e.g., Jayanth K. 
Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2010) (exploring why 
the international trend toward cross border practice has not occurred in India).  Related 
problems occur from multijurisdictional practice in the United States.  See generally Carol A. 
Needham, Multijurisdictional Practice Regulations Governing Attorneys Conducting 
a Transactional Practice, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331. 
 154. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Statement from Co-Chairs, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/chairs.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). 
 155. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, 
and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010) (providing 
a historical review of the MDP debate in the United States and Canada). 
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While states consider the implications of multijurisdictional practice 
and tweak the state-based ethics rules, international norms are increasingly 
being imposed on lawyers through treaty obligations.  As Professor 
Laurel Terry has observed, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) raises significant questions about the application of generally 
applicable treaty obligations to state-based legal regulation.156  The federal 
government, through its treaty-making power, can sweep attorneys under 
treaty obligations and instantly harmonize lawyer conduct to make the 
obligations consistent with international norms.  The legal profession 
can anticipate more treaty-based obligations. 
III.  CONTEXTUALIZATION 
This movement of the center of gravity in attorney regulation to 
federal law and norms highlights several important trends, most anticipated 
by Professor Zacharias.  But as developed above, federal regulation has 
not occurred via an express preemption of lawyer regulation by the 
states.  Such preemption could be both politically confrontational and 
problematic in practice.157  But federal norms are seen as complementing 
state regulation in those areas of unique federal interest.  These areas of 
substantive law and agency practice all have sharply defined federal 
interest: SEC, immigration, patent and trademark, tax, social security, 
among others.  This method of complementing state-based regulation 
becomes more significant because we have increased specialization in 
legal practice, which results in increased expertise and regulation in 
context.158 
This contextualization is a net social good because it generally 
addresses areas of attorney conduct that are neglected by state regulators.  
Insufficient bar resources and efficiency concerns likely play a role in 
this functional bar deference.  There has been little hew and cry about 
the expanding norms, as long as they do not directly contradict state core 
values.  For example, at the 2010 ABA National Conference on 
Professional Responsibility, Bar Counsel for the District of Columbia 
 
 156. See Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its 
Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 
(2001), revised in 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 1387 (2002). 
 157. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 27, 29. 
 158. See, e.g., REGAN JR., supra note 28, at 366. 
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stated publicly that they welcome the actions of the federal agencies to 
supplement state bar regulatory activities.159 
As a practical matter the state bars lost the battle of predominant self-
regulation, assuming it ever truly had a system of self-regulation.  
Professor Zacharias noted that the bar continues to cling to the “myth of 
self-regulation,” but functionally is a coregulator with these other 
systems.160  Indeed, the desire to retain some role in self-regulation was 
the impetus for the ABA 20/20 Commission. 
This federalization and contextualization is creating some significant 
challenges, but they are manageable issues.  First is a question about 
choice of law.  If there is a direct conflict between federal and state 
attorney regulation, the federal regulation will trump.  But choice of law 
norms become complicated when regulatory systems are layered, which 
is often the case in attorney regulation.  A lawyer practicing before the 
Patent and Trademark Office may simultaneously be held to federal 
agency, federal district court, and state court regulations—sometimes all 
in direct conflict.  Efforts to resolve these conflicts by incorporating 
choice of law standards, such as ABA Model Rule 8.5, have had a 
checkered history, in part because some states have resisted a uniform 
conflicts rule.161  But when the Committee on Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States held a major conference to 
explore Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct (FRAC), even representatives 
of major national firms and the Department of Justice reported that, with 
some relatively narrow exceptions, the contextualized system was 
working, aided by some realistic court supervision.162 
Ironically, another concern raised by contextualization has been 
capture of the regulation by the regulated bar, especially in narrow 
agency practice with “revolving doors.”  Of course, purely state-based 
self-regulation has long been criticized for unduly reflecting the self-
interest of the profession, at the expense of protecting the public.  
Indeed, the argument can be made that contextualization reduces the 
danger of capture by introducing a kind of “checks and balances” of 
different regulatory realities on each other.  Thus, the criminal defense 
bar is traditionally strong in state-based regulatory systems, an influence 
that led to concern by the United States Department of Justice whose 
lawyers had to act across the country in regulatory systems that, in 
 
 159. Wallace E. “Gene” Shipp, Jr., D.C. Bar Counsel, Remarks at the Panel on 
Prosecutions of Lawyers: Trends and Implications at the 36th ABA Nat’l Conference on 
Prof’l Responsibility (June 3, 2010). 
 160. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 161. See Carla C. Ward, Comment, The Law of Choice: Implementation of ABA 
Model Rule 8.5, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 173 (2005). 
 162. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 11, at 237–61. 
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certain cases, the Department felt were unreasonable.163  But criminal 
defense lawyers practicing in tax cases would face a different, national 
context, which could balance out more local capture.  There has been no 
serious empirical study of the effect of contextualization on capture, and 
anecdotal testimony during the FRAC Conference was inconclusive.  It 
is quite conceivable that a serious study would show development of 
attorney regulation by federal contextualization was more protective of 
the public interest than the traditional state system.  In any event, these 
concerns have not slowed the process itself. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: ZACHARIAS’S PROPHECY 
As early as 1829, the great Justice Joseph Story predicted that the 
combination of the new national law schools, the increased power of 
federal courts and federal jurisprudence, and the influence of treaty 
obligations and global trade would result in a truly national profession.  
But powerful historical forces sent his vision the same way as his 
landmark decision, Swift v. Tyson, for nearly two centuries.164 
New historical forces, which Justice Story never dreamed of, have 
now emerged: most particularly the new scope of federal judicial 
rulemaking, the regulatory sweep of Congress over all professions, and 
the vast expansion of federal regulatory agencies.  Professor Zacharias 
was the prophet who would first clearly see the implication of this new 
world for the legal profession and for the American system of justice.  
For this we are all in his debt. 
But the prophecy has manifested itself in an unexpected way.  The 
political realities of entrenched state bars, often projecting themselves 
through national bar associations, have made a direct upheaval of 
professional regulation both unlikely and, perhaps, undesirable and 
unnecessary.  Contextualization of an ever increasingly specialized 
federal bar has resulted in growing and effective regulation by the 
combined incremental effects of congressional action, judicial rulemaking, 
federal litigation ethics, and the overall influence of global and 
 
 163. Id. at 27–34. 
 164. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN 
OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 237–70 (1985); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: 
A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817–1967, at 92–139 (1967); Daniel R. Coquillette, 
“Mourning Venice and Genoa”: Joseph Story, Legal Education, and the Lex Mercatoria, 
in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 11 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005). 
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technological change.  Thus, Zacharias’s Prophecy is coming true, but in 
a way that uniquely reflects the conditions of a post-modern age. 
 
